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  PART	  ONE	  
	  
Experience	  is	  nothing	  
	  
if	  not	  a	  relation	  
between	  the	  thing	  out	  there	  it	  aspires	  to	  name	  
and	  a	  word.	  
	  
And	  the	  same	  for	  	  
our	  revolution	  




(Whatever	  the	  word	  is	  to	  the	  mind	  
the	  thinking	  performs	  that	  role	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Hunger,	  Bakhtin	  wrote	  in	  1929	  
—he	  was	  sentenced	  that	  year—	  
will	  be	  felt	  
as	  an	  insistence	  on	  my	  rights	  
a	  plea	  for	  mercy	  
	  
in	  a	  style	  flowery	  or	  plain	  
confidently,	  hesitantly	  
apologetically,	  irritably,	  outraged;	  
	  
any	  of	  those	  ways	  
at	  cruel	  Nature,	  at	  myself	  
or	  at	  society,	  
in	  short	  in	  thoroughly	  
public	  form,	  






To	  say	  I	  don’t	  believe	  in	  the	  	  
bourgeois	  paradise	  and	  its	  great	  future	  
is	  to	  splice	  in	  five	  words	  	  
and	  a	  change	  of	  tone.	  To	  say	  it’s	  glorious	  
ironically	  is	  equally	  a	  mime.	  We	  sing	  out	  	  
phrases	  we	  don’t	  own	  	  
all	  the	  time.	  It’s	  indirect	  speech.	  
	  
The	  speaker’s	  distance	  
from	  the	  words	  great	  and	  glorious	  above	  
does	  not	  require	  quotation	  	  
marks	  to	  be	  gauged	  eye-­‐wise.	  An	  ear	  
which	  we	  all	  have	  
will	  suffice.	  
	  
Osteomyelitis	  plagued	  Bakhtin	  in	  Vitebsk.	  
His	  cigarettes	  were	  often	  rolled	  from	  the	  earliest	  philosophy	  left.	  
The	  manuscript	  of	  Towards	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Act	  starts	  	  
ten	  pages	  into	  the	  throat	  	  
of	  Mikhail	  Mikhailovich	  Bakhtin,	  	  
and	  Sigmund	  Freud	  had	  twenty	  cigars	  a	  day	  but	  no	  jaw	  
for	  the	  last	  four	  thousand	  and	  four.	  
If	  you’re	  good	  at	  addiction	  you	  can	  hold	  a	  thought.	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Even	  a	  sentence	  
with	  only	  the	  unity	  of	  an	  utterance	  
and	  no	  main	  verb	  can	  stand	  as	  itself.	  
	  
A	  line	  as	  a	  poem.	  
	  
Nothing	  other	  than	  units	  	  
of	  exchange	  in	  dialogue.	  
	  
The	  paragraph,	  the	  stanza	  
	  
have	  no	  other	  grammar	  than	  this.	  
	  
When	  thinking	  to	  myself	  the	  units	  of	  inner	  speech,	  	  
they	  resemble	  the	  multiple	  




But	  what’s	  the	  world?	  
	  
Charles	  Saunders	  Peirce	  was	  a	  19th	  Century	  conservative,	  unopposed	  to	  slavery	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   and	  domestically	  violent;	  
he	  died	  in	  poverty	  writing	  all	  the	  while	  
something	  like	  the	  following:	  
	  
Between	  the	  nights	  that	  I	  perceive	  
an	  even	  number	  of	  shooting	  stars	  
and	  the	  letters	  I	  receive	  that	  day	  on	  my	  table	  
there	  is	  no	  connection	  nor	  would	  I	  expect	  one,	  
most	  laws	  simply	  are	  not	  there	  
and	  no	  science	  requires	  such	  order	  	  
of	  our	  worlds.	  So	  
	  
Peirce	  jams	  the	  Divine	  
Watchmaker’s	  all-­‐eyeing	  natural	  law,	  argues	  	  
order	  doesn’t	  join	  up	  many	  things	  at	  all.	  	  
(How	  many	  words	  in	  this	  sentence	  
bears	  no	  relation	  to	  how	  many	  hairs	  on	  your	  head.)	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Science’s	  precipitating	  causes	  are	  confined	  to	  those	  times	  	  
when	  two	  things	  are	  predictably	  regular	  
and	  neither’s	  rules	  allow	  for	  the	  other	  
and	  can’t	  	  
in	  any	  word	  we	  know	  yet,	  only	  here	  they	  are	  blindingly	  
together	  (e.g.	  meaning	  and	  internal	  theatre)	  	  
till	  sealed	  over	  inductively	  by	  a	  law,	  because	  we	  can’t	  stand	  	  




1.	  	  UP	  TO	  THE	  ASTERISK	  IN	  PART	  THREE	  
The	  poem’s	   title	   is	   taken	   from	   the	   1929	  book	  Marxism	   and	   the	   Philosophy	   of	  
Language,	  which	  was	  written,	  but	  not	  signed,	  by	  the	  Soviet	  philosopher	  Mikhail	  
Bakhtin	   (1895-­‐1975).	   The	   text	   was	   publicly	   attributed	   to	   Bakhtin’s	   colleague	  
Valentin	   Voloshinov;	   the	   fact	   that	   Bakhtin	   was	   sentenced	   for	   his	   Orthodox	  
Christianity	   later	   that	   year	   explains	   the	   need	   for	   the	   pseudonymity,	   and	  
perhaps	  even	  for	  the	  Marxism	  (Clarke	  and	  Holquist	  146-­‐170).	  	  
	   Part	  One	  of	  the	  poem	  explores	  the	   idea	   in	  Part	  2.3	  of	  Marxism	  and	   the	  
Philosophy	   of	   Language	   that	   experience	   only	   exists	   within	   signs	   (83-­‐98).	   It	  
traces	   Bakhtin’s	   key	   example	   of	   this—his	   demonstration	   of	   the	   discursive	  
nature	   of	   experiences	   of	   extreme	  hunger	   (86-­‐89).	  The	  poem	   suggests	   a	   likely	  
implication	  of	  those	  necessarily	  guarded	  arguments:	  that	  the	  recent,	  shattering	  
1917	  revolution	  was	  no	  more	  foundational	  than	  any	  other	  semiotic	  experience.	  
Its	  meaning	  was	  and	  remains	  in	  how	  we	  represent	  it	  performatively	  to	  ourselves,	  
including	  in	  our	  heads	  while	  reading	  this	  paragraph.	  	  
	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   Bakhtin’s	   theory	   of	   thinking,	   which	   he	   terms	   ‘inner	  
speech’	  (Marxism	  29).	  Now	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  Bakhtin,	  as	  many	  have	  noted	  
(for	   example,	   Godzich	   9)	   anticipates	   a	   certain	   postmodernity	   and	   even	   post-­‐
structuralism	   in	   his	   various	  writings.	   It	   is	   nonetheless	  worth	   underlining	   the	  
distance	  of	  his	   characterisation	  of	   thinking	   to	   yourself	   as	   a	   form	  of	   imagined	  
speaking	   from	   the	   Derridean	   diagnosis	   of	   thought	   as	   ultimately	   writing	  
(Derrida),	  and	  with	  that,	  Bakhtin’s	  distance	  from	  the	  contemporary	  elevation	  of	  
the	   word	   ‘text’	   to	   cover	   the	   whole	   of	   social	   experience.	   The	   difference	   is	  
important	   because	   when	   Bakhtin	   writes	   that	   one’s	   ‘inner	   world	   and	   thought	  
has	  its	  stabilised	  social	  audience’	  (Marxism	  86),	  he	  means	  not	  merely	  that	  our	  
thoughts	   are	  necessarily	   composed	   in	   trans-­‐individual	   and	   indeed	  historically	  
mutable	  signs,	  but	   further	  that	  when	  we	   ‘say’	   them,	   in	  our	  heads,	  we	  have	  an	  
imagined	   auditor	   in	   mind	   (even	   if	   not	   distinctly	   so).	   For	   in	   thought,	   as	   in	  
conversation,	   ‘I	   give	   myself	   verbal	   shape	   from	   another’s	   point	   of	   view’	   (86),	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anticipating	   in	   advance	   the	   addressee’s	   likely	   response	   to	   my	   words	   and	  
contouring	  my	   communications	   accordingly.	   I	   perform	   for	   another’s	   imputed	  
understanding	   even	   when	   simply	   acknowledging	   to	   myself	   (‘apologetically,	  
irritably,	  angrily,	  indignantly,	  etc.’	  (87))	  my	  current	  state	  of	  starvation.	  	  
	   Part	  Two	  of	  the	  poem	  treats	  another	  major	  contribution	  of	  Marxism	  and	  
the	   Philosophy	   of	   Language,	   and	   indeed	   of	   Bakhtin’s	   oeuvre	   more	   generally	  
(most	   celebratedly,	   Dialogic	   Imagination	   41-­‐83).	   For	   not	   only	   does	   Bakhtin	  
suggest	   that	  our	   thinking	  anticipates	  an	   internal	  auditor.	  Any	  such	   individual	  
speech	   act,	   whether	   it	   be	   ‘inner	   speech’	   or	   out	   loud,	   is	   already	   shot	   through	  
with	   other	   voices.	   Bakhtin’s	   idea	   is	   that	   indirect	   speech	   is	   far	  more	   common	  
than	   the	   standard	   grammatical	   analyses	   will	   allow	   (Marxism	   109-­‐59	   passim).	  
‘He	   said	   he	   is	   going	   to	   the	   shop’	   is	   of	   course	   the	   indirect	   version	   of	  what	   in	  
direct	   speech	   would	   be	   ‘He	   said	   “I	   am	   going	   to	   the	   shop”.’	   But	   what	   of	  
sentences	  like	  ‘She’s	  a	  great	  one	  for	  the	  free	  market	  and	  the	  level	  playing	  field’?	  
Note	   the	   implicit	  distance	   the	  putative	  speaker	  of	   this	  sentence	  demonstrates	  
towards	   a	   phrase	   (‘level	   playing	   field’)	   he	   or	   she	   nonetheless	   utters,	   and	   our	  
capacity	  as	  hearers	  /	  readers	  to	  imagine	  a	  broader	  context	  providing	  all	  sorts	  of	  
reasons	   for	   this.	   Bakhtin’s	   point	   is	   that	   one’s	   speech	   regularly	   conveys	   alien	  
phrases	  and	  marks	  them	  as	  such,	  as	  the	  property	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  group	  (a	  
class,	   a	   generation,	   a	   social	   set,	   an	  occupational	   group…),	  marking	  one’s	   own	  
belongings	   in	   the	   process.	   In	   fact	   our	   conversations	   are	   replete	   with	   such	  
received	  speakings,	  regularly	  admixed	  with	  implicit	  authorial	  judgement	  on	  the	  
world-­‐views	  they	  and	  we	  presuppose.	  	  
	   One	  might	  even,	  to	  push	  Bakhtin’s	  thinking	  a	  little	  here,	  describe	  speech	  
as	   proceeding	   from	   a	   sort	   of	   mixing	   desk	   and	   suggest,	   further,	   that	   poetic	  
metaphor—for	  example,	  Elizabeth	  Bishop’s	  ‘The	  armored	  cars	  of	  dreams’	  (30)—
is	   itself	   a	   form	   of	   indirect	   speaking,	   a	   conveying	   of	   a	  word	   or	   phrase	   from	   a	  
different	  way	  of	  speaking	  into	  this	  current	  one.	  	  
	   This	   sort	  of	   theorising	   raises	  a	  question,	  one	   that	  Bakhtin	  himself	   fails	  
either	   to	  articulate	  or	  answer.	   If	  our	  speech,	  and	  so	  our	  very	  thinking,	   is	  shot	  
through	  with	  other	  people’s	  words	  in	  this	  fashion,	  what	  gives	  any	  one	  of	  us	  the	  
illusion	  of	  being	   the	   same	  as	  him	  or	  herself?	  However,	   the	  poem	  does	  not	   so	  
much	   raise	   this	   question	   as	   rather	   re-­‐purpose	   one	   of	   Walter	   Benjamin’s	  
enigmas	  on	  the	  topic	  (‘Not	  to	  mention	  that	  most	  terrible	  of	  drugs	  –	  ourselves	  –	  
which	   we	   take	   in	   silence’);	   his	   analogy	   between	   ‘the	   hashish	   trance’	   one	  
experiences	  from	  smoking	  that	  substance,	  and	  the	  trance	  effected	  by	  ‘thinking	  
(which	  is	  eminently	  narcotic)’	  (190).	  	  
	   Part	   Three	   of	   the	   poem	  draws	   similarly	   from	  Bakhtin’s	  writings,	   again	  
with	  attention	  to	  his	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  polyphonic	  subject.	  In	  this	  case,	  
the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  philosopher’s	  further	  illumination,	  in	  Part	  1.3	  of	  Marxism,	  as	  
to	  the	  nature	  of	  ‘inner	  speech’	  (37-­‐39).	  Thinking	  appears,	  Bakhtin	  writes,	  to	  be	  
composed	   of	   ‘whole	   entities	   somewhat	   resembling	   a	   passage	   of	   monologic	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speech	  or	  whole	  utterances.’	  But	  when	  we	  look	  closer	  (as	  if	  through	  the	  trance)	  
what	  we	  discover	  is	  that	  the	  cut	  and	  thrust	  of	  our	  own	  thoughts	  are	  much	  more	  
akin	  to	  ‘the	  alternating	  lines	  of	  a	  dialogue’	  (38).	  
	   That	   is	   to	  say,	  when	  any	   individual	  ponders	  an	   issue	  to	  him	  or	  herself,	  
their	   cogitation	   is	   not	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  monologue,	   but	   rather	   a	   sequence	   of	  
voices	   that	   propose	   and	   rejoin,	   dialogically.	   A	   voice	   comes	   up	   with	   an	   idea,	  
another	  emerges	  to	  nuance	  or	  reject	  it,	  a	  third	  comes	  in,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  
	   In	   terms	   of	   my	   discussion	   above,	   this	   would	   suggest	   that	   part	   of	   the	  
reason	   we	   direct	   our	   thoughts	   (again,	   our	   ‘inner	   speech’)	   toward	   an	   inner	  
addressee	  is	  that	  that	  addressee	  will	  offer	  the	  very	  next	  thought.	  
	   This	   part	   of	   the	   poem	   includes	   close	   paraphrase	   of	   the	   quote	   three	  
paragraphs	   above,	   and	   in	   the	   process	   addresses	   what	   it	   suggests	   is	   a	   public	  
manifestation	   of	   thought’s	   inner	   dialogism.	   I	   am	   referring	   to	   Bakhtin’s	  
argument	   (Marxism	   110-­‐112)	   that	   the	   ‘higher’	   grammatical	   forms	   (paragraph,	  
stanza,	  even	  sentence)	  do	  not	  have	  determinate	  rules,	  but	  rather	  stand	  or	   fall	  
on	  their	  ability	  to	  act	  as	  utterances	  in	  a	  putative	  dialogue.	  An	  essay,	  that	   is	  to	  
say,	   is	   not	   a	   monologue,	   but	   a	   series	   of	   distinct	   voices	   within	   the	   one	   that	  
propose	   and	   rejoin,	   dialogically,	   by	   paragraph,	   and	   often	   even	   (‘on	   the	   other	  
hand…’)	  by	  sentence	  (111).	  	  
	   Sometimes	   this	   occurs	   even	   within	   the	   same	   word.	   As	   Finnegans	  
Wake—whose	  author	  Bakhtin	  so	  curiously	  failed	  to	  comment	  upon	  (Kershner	  
15-­‐21)—has	  it,	  ‘We	  cannot	  say	  aye	  to	  aye.	  We	  cannot	  smile	  noes	  from	  noes’	  (114).	  
Such	  for	  James	  Joyce	  is	  speech,	  and	  such	  is	  ‘the	  writer	  complexus’	  as	  well:	  for	  ‘if	  
the	  hand	  was	  one,	   the	  minds	  of	   active	  and	  agitated	  were	  more	   than	   so’	   (114).	  
And	  this	  is	  true	  ‘everywhair’	  (108),	  even	  in	  the	  ‘Vivle’	  (110).	  
	   All	   of	   which	   is	   why	   Bakhtin	   holds	   that	   novelists,	   who	   split	   their	  
utterance	  into	  multiple	  dramatic	  characters,	  and	  weave	  a	  continual	  polyphony	  
of	  indirect	  speech	  through	  their	  narrators’	  speech	  as	  well,	  are	  representative	  of	  
the	  human	  subject’s	  plurivocal	  relation	  to	  discourse	  more	  generally.	  	  
But	  why	  then	  do	  we	  pretend	  otherwise?	  
	  
2.	  	  AFTER	  THE	  ASTERISK	  IN	  PART	  THREE	  
Why	   might	   the	   Bakhtinian	   theories	   entertained	   above,	   if	   in	   fact	   true,	  
nonetheless	   strike	   us	   as	   so	   counter-­‐intuitive?	   Should	   they	   not	   simply	   be	  
common	  knowledge?	  Whence	   the	  drive,	   in	   any	  of	  us,	   to	   imagine	   that	  we	   are	  
whole?	  
	   Let	  me	  pose	  a	  response	  to	  these	  questions.	  This	  will	  sound	  at	  first	  like	  a	  
digression,	  for	  it	   involves	  a	  polemic	  stance	  on	  creative	  art’s	  status	  as	  research.	  
The	  relevance	  will	  hopefully	  emerge	  as	  I	  proceed.	  My	  stance	  is	  as	  follows:	  I	  do	  
not	  believe	   that	  artists	  wishing	  to	  contribute	   to	  knowledge	  should	  attempt	  to	  
satisfy	   all	   of	   the	   various	   stages	   of	   scholarly	   investigation,	   however	   one	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formalises	   its	   elements.i	   I	   assert	   that	   an	   artist	   who	   attempts	   to	   do	   anything	  
more	   scholarly	   or	   scientific	   than	  pose	   a	  question	   to	   an	   audience	   through	   the	  
medium	  of	  his	  or	  her	  artwork	  will	  be	  harming	  that	  work’s	  capacity	  to	  function	  
as	   artwork;	   and	   I	   additionally	   assert	   that	   the	  harm	  will	   extend	   to	   that	  work’s	  
potential	  contribution	  to	  knowledge	  as	  well.	  
	   I	   have	   a	   target	   in	   my	   sights:	   the	   recent	   emergence	   of	   practice-­‐led	  
research,	  a	  genre	   that	  allows	  artists	   to	  be	  assessed	   for	  PhD	  awards,	  and	  other	  
indices	  of	  researcher	  status,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  package	  comprising	  artwork	  plus	  essay	  
on	   that	   work’s	   contribution	   to	   knowledge.	   The	   essay	   typically	   contains	   a	  
literature	   review,	   the	   outline	   of	   a	   method	   and	   the	   statement	   of	   a	   research	  
question,	   in	   something	   like	   that	   order	   of	   priority;	   in	   proposing	   that	   such	   an	  
‘exegesis’	   represents	   a	   dethroning	   of	   the	   traditional	   critic	   in	   favour	   of	   artists	  
themselves	   ‘claiming	   ownership	   and	   taking	   responsibility’	   for	   communicating	  
the	   meanings	   of	   their	   work	   (8),	   Carole	   Gray	   implies	   that	   such	   a	   document	  
might	  provide	  the	  artwork	  with	  an	  answer	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  thesis	  as	  well.	  Now	  
Michael	   Biggs	   and	   Daniela	   Büchler	   do	   not	   directly	   criticise	   such	   ideas	   in	  
offering	  the	  following	  formulation,	  but	  I	  think	  it	  indicates	  quite	  concisely	  what	  
is	   wrong	   with	   practice-­‐led	   research	   all	   the	   same.	   Having	   asserted	   that	   ‘the	  
academic	   research	   model	   attempts	   to	   hone	   in	   on	   a	   single	   answer	   to	   a	  
question,’ii	  Biggs	  and	  Büchler	  proceed	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  arts	  community	  has	  a	  
contrary	  aim	  for	  the	  questions	  its	  work	  raises:	  
the	  creative	  community	  values	  “the	  event”	  which	  promotes	  the	  direct	  encounter	  
with	   the	   artifact.	   The	   direct	   encounter	   in	   turn	   precipitates	   a	   plurality	   of	  
experiences	   and,	   because	   these	   experiences	   are	   all	   different,	   a	   single	   unified	  
answer	  does	  not	  emerge.	  (91)	  
What	   this	   suggests,	  pace	  Gray,	   is	   that	   for	   an	   artist	   to	  be	   ‘claiming	  ownership	  
and	  taking	  responsibility’	  for	  the	  meanings	  their	  work	  unleashes	  is	  tantamount	  
to	  their	  obstructing	  it	  from	  actually	  functioning	  as	  art.	  	  
	   Now	  not	   all	   theorists	   in	   the	  Creative	  Arts	  will,	   I	   admit,	  be	   as	  blithe	  as	  
Gray	  about	  the	  desirability	  of	  artists	  claiming	  rights	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  
work	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  an	  attached	  ‘exegesis.’	  But	  the	  moment	  you	  argue	  
in	  such	  a	  document	  that	  your	  work’s	  contribution	  to	  knowledge	  is	  X,	  or	  can	  be	  
best	  understood	   through	  a	   consideration	  of	   context	  Y,	   are	  you	  not	  effectively	  
asserting	  the	  value	  of	  a	  ‘single	  unified’	  perspective	  (the	  academically	  ‘legitimate’	  
one)	  on	  the	  work	  all	  the	  same?	  For	  it	  is	  precisely	  an	  author’s	  refusal	  to	  offer	  any	  
canonical,	  authoritative	  position	  in	  his	  or	  her	  artwork	  that	  opens	  the	  space	  for	  
plural	   interpretations	   of	   it	   to	   emerge—and	   not	   just	   (one	   might	   draw	   on	  
Bakhtin	   to	  add)	   to	  emerge	  within	  communities,	  but	   even	  within	  one	  and	   the	  
same	   audience	  member.	   And	   if	   the	   translation	   of	   my	   poem	   above	   has	   done	  
anything	  much	  more	   than	  carry	   the	   verses’	   conundrums	  over	   into	   something	  
having	  approximately	  similar	  effects	   in	  prose,	   then	   it	  has	   failed	  by	  dint	  of	   the	  
argument	  just	  rehearsed.	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   My	   argument	   is	   not,	   however,	   that	   art	   can	   never	   bear	   a	   relation	   to	  
knowledge.	   Rather,	   its	   tenor	   is	   to	   imply	   that	   if	   artists	   wish	   their	   work	   to	   be	  
chalked	   up	   against	   any	   of	   the	   variously	   named	   and	   theorised	   stages	   in	   any	  
statement	  of	  scholarly	  method,	  they	  had	  better	  aim	  no	  further	  than	  the	  initial	  
stage,	   the	  one	   that	   sparks	  off	   inquiry	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   I	   am	  referring	   to	   that	  
which	  in	  scholarly	  and	  scientific	  work	  ‘precipitates	  a	  plurality	  of	  experiences’	  by	  
dint	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   poses	   a	  problem	   for	   knowledge,	   and	   leaves	   the	   reader	  
hanging.	  I	  am	  referring,	  that	  is,	  to	  the	  compelling	  research	  question,	  and	  I	  will	  
add	  that	   the	  best	  of	  post-­‐structuralist	  writing	  represents	  so	  many	  entries	   into	  
just	   this	   methodological	   category.	   University-­‐based	   artists	   should	   offer	   us	   a	  
problem,	   without	   solution.	   Audiences	   will	   themselves	   be	   compelled—if	   the	  
work	  is	  any	  good—to	  find	  some	  other,	  new	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  it.	  	  
	   For	  that	  is	  how	  science	  itself	  works.	  You	  can	  even	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  
formalising	  this.	  In	  a	  little-­‐studied	  1901	  essay	  entitled	  ‘On	  the	  Logic	  of	  Drawing	  
History	   from	  Ancient	  Documents’	   (see	   the	   brief	   comments	   in	  Misak	   18),	   the	  
American	  philosopher	   of	   science	  Charles	   Saunders	  Peirce	   (1839-­‐1914)	   explains	  
the	   root	   causes	   of	   scientific	   inquiry.	   His	   assertion	   that	   ‘it	   has	   always	   been	  
agreed	   that	   the	   tendency	   of	   the	   understanding	   was	   towards	   synthesis,	   or	  
unification’	   (‘On	   the	   Logic’	   92)	   is	   central	   to	   this	   explanation	   (and	   will	   help	  
bring	   this	   seeming	  digression	  back	   to	   the	   lacuna	   I	   noted	   in	  Bakhtin	   as	  well).	  
Peirce	  thus	  takes	  issue	  with	  logician	  John	  Venn’s	  claim	  that	  ‘it	  is	  the	  isolation	  of	  
a	  fact	  that	  creates	  the	  need	  of	  an	  explanation’	  (91).	  Venn	  would	  seem	  to	  mean	  
that	  once	  we	  have	  observed	  or	   isolated	  a	  rule-­‐bound	  phenomenon	  within	  the	  
world,	  and	  accordingly	  labelled	  it	  a	  fact,	  we	  then	  feel	  driven	  to	  ask	  what	  causes	  
it	   to	   be	   or	   behave	   thus.	   Peirce	   disagrees.	   For	   him,	   everything	   around	   us	  
presents	   itself—well	  before	  any	   formal	   investigation—as	   factual	   (for	   instance,	  
the	  facts	  that	  this	  is	  a	  chair,	  that	  a	  table,	  up	  there	  the	  roof,	  that	  I	  am	  sitting	  in	  
solitude,	  it	  is	  dusk);	  for	  the	  tendency	  of	  our	  understanding	  (‘towards	  synthesis,	  
or	   unification’)	   is	   automatically	   to	   grasp	   the	   world	   as	   comprised	   of	   already	  
arrived	  facts.	  Further,	  nothing	  in	  this	   implies	  a	  drive	  to	   inquiry:	   ‘I	  have	  never’	  
Peirce	  adds	  ‘heard	  it	  suggested	  that	  intelligence	  per	  se	  demands	  complexity	  and	  
multiplicity’	   (92).	  Rather,	   inquiry	  arises	   from	  the	   frustration	  of	   this	  automatic	  
drive	  towards	  unity.	  	  
	   This	  is	  even	  more	  apparent	  when	  we	  reflect	  upon	  the	  text	  that	  Peirce	  is	  
clearly	   invoking	   in	   the	   sentences	   above,	   when	   mentioning	   ‘synthesis’	   and	  
‘unification.’	   Immanuel	  Kant’s	  Critique	   of	   Pure	  Reason	  discusses	  our	  tendency	  
(he	  calls	   it	   the	   ‘synthetic	  unity	  of	  apperception’	  (248))	  spontaneously	  to	  grasp	  
the	  world	  as	  so	  many	  unified	  entities,	  along	  the	  lines	  I	  have	  just	  rehearsed.	  But	  
the	  Critique	  offers	  a	   further	  version	  of	  this	  drive	  to	  unification:	  our	  automatic	  
(‘a	  priori’	  in	  his	  terms)	  sense	  that	  the	  universe	  in	  which	  we	  find	  such	  unities	  is	  
one	  and	  the	  same	  as	  itself	  as	  well.	  That	  everything	  I	  see	  seems	  to	  hang	  together	  
in	   the	   same	   reality	   only	   underlines	   why	   our	   isolating	   the	   fact	   that	   this	  
particular	   thing	   is	   the	   case	   creates	   no	   real	   hackles—for	   our	   tendency	   is	   to	  
assume	  that	  any	  such	  fact	  belongs	  to	  the	  broader	  scheme	  of	  things,	  along	  with	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everything	  else.	  Even	  more	   strikingly,	  Kant	  asserts	  a	  direct	   link	   (in	  his	   terms,	  
‘the	   transcendental	   unity	   of	   self-­‐consciousness’	   (247))	   between	   all	   such	  
tendencies	  to	  synthesis	  in	  our	  perception	  of	  things,	  and	  each	  individual’s	  sense	  
of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  consistency	  as	  subject.	  My	  deep	  sense	  that	  ‘there	  is	  only	  one	  
space	  and	  time,	   in	  which	  all	   forms	  of	  appearance	  and	  all	  relations	  of	  being	  or	  
non-­‐being	  take	  place’	  (234)	  is	  part	  and	  parcel,	  for	  Kant,	  with	  my	  deep	  sense	  that	  
my	  nose,	  which	  is	  now	  itching,	  is	  actually	  the	  same	  nose	  as	  the	  one	  belonging	  
to	   the	  me	  who	   sits	   here	  writing.	  Mind,	  Kant	  will	   not	   allow	   that	   any	   of	   these	  
unities	  are	  ultimately	  ‘true’	  (for	  him,	  we	  have	  no	  such	  ultimate	  knowledge	  (255),	  
not	   even	   of	   our	   consistency	   as	   selves	   (259-­‐60));	   but	   simply	   that	   we	   are	   so	  
constituted	   as	   to	  want	   spontaneously	   to	   grasp	   things	   thus:	   as	   so	  many	   ones,	  
and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  overall	  One	  (that	  ‘One’	  being	  at	  once	  reality,	  but	  also	  
the	  consistent	  ‘One’	  I	  feel	  myself	  to	  be	  in	  observing	  it—again,	  these	  are	  for	  Kant	  
the	  same	  thing).	  	  
	   And	  really,	  what	  would	  drive	  me	  to	  complicate	  my	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  so	  
as	  to	  ponder	  whether	  that	  table	  over	  there,	  which	  is	  clearly	  a	  table,	  might	   for	  
instance	  obey	  a	  different	  law	  of	  gravity	  than	  all	  the	  things	  around	  it;	  or	  that	  this	  
itch,	  though	  I	  feel	  it,	  might	  actually	  be	  occurring	  on	  another’s	  nose?	  	  
	   Peirce	   is	   clear	   as	   to	  what	  might:	   a	   fact	   to	   the	   contrary	   of	   our	   familiar	  
syntheses,	   one	   suggesting	   that	   the	   thing	   presenting	   itself	   to	   me	   as	   a	   clear	  
instance	  of	  such	  and	  such	  a	  thing	  (a	  swan)	  does	  not	  necessarily	  amount	  to	  what	  
I	  take	  it	  to	  be	  at	  all	  (for	  how	  can	  swans	  be	  black?).	  Peirce	  suggests	  that	  this	  sort	  
of	   instantly	   unsynthesisable	   but	   also	   impossible-­‐to-­‐ignore	   experience	   is	   what	  
Venn	  really	  had	  in	  mind,	  or	  at	  least	  should	  have	  had	  in	  mind,	  when	  theorising	  
the	  root	  causes	  of	  inquiry.	  
I	   suspect	   that	  when	  Mr	  Venn	   speaks	  of	   isolation,	  he	   is	   thinking	  of	   there	  being	  
other	  facts	  from	  which	  the	  given	  fact	  is	  separated;	  and	  that	  it	  is	  not	  isolation	  he	  
means	   but	   separation.	  Now	   separation	   is	   itself	   a	   kind	   of	   connection;	   so	   that	   if	  
this	   be	   his	   meaning,	   the	   state	   of	   things	   which	   calls	   for	   explanation	   is	   a	  
connection	  which	   is	  not	   satisfactory	   to	   the	  mind.	   In	   that	   case,	   it	   is	   incumbent	  
upon	  Mr	  Venn	  to	  explain	  himself	  more	  precisely,	  and	  to	  say	  in	  what	  respect	  it	  is	  
unsatisfactory.	  If	  he	  were	  to	  say,	  “unsatisfactory	  in	  being	  contrary	  to	  what	  ought	  
to	  be	  expected,”	  he	  would	  come	  to	  my	  position,	  precisely.	  (92)	  
Kant	  helps	  us	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  not	  just	  our	  world-­‐view,	  but	  our	  sense	  of	  our	  own	  
bodies	  which	   feels	   somehow	  at	   stake	   in	   such	  moments;	  which	   threat	  has	   the	  
further	  effect	  of	  driving	  us	  to	  remedy	  the	  matter	  by	  putting	  in	  place	  the	  whole	  
panoply	  of	  scientific	  method,	  from	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  hypothesis	  as	  to	  what	  
might	  actually	  be	  the	  case,	  the	  devising	  of	  an	  experimental	  apparatus	  to	  test	  it,	  
the	  observation	  of	  statistically	  significant	  results	  from	  such	  and	  so	  forth.	  There	  
are	  of	  course	  much	  more	  colloquial	  versions	  of	  this	  same	  urge	  to	  repair	  through	  
knowledge	   (and	   other	   strategies	   altogether,	   including	   blocking	   one’s	   ears	  
(Peirce	   ‘The	  Fixation’	   11-­‐14)).	  Kant	  helps	  us	   to	   see	   that	  we	  do	  all	   of	   this	   so	   to	  
make	  ourselves	  ‘whole’	  again.	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   My	  position	  is	  that	  artists	  engaging	  with	  the	  university	  should	  leave	  all	  
those	   later,	   reparatory	   stages	   of	   inquiry	   to	   others,	   and	   hold	   to	   what	   causes	  
knowledge	   consternation.	   Their	   training	   is	   all	   about	  making	   others	   scramble	  
for	  knowledge	   (or	  whatever	  other	  synthesis—including	   the	  synthesis	   that	  any	  
response	   through	   affect	   effectively	   amounts	   to	   (Peirce	   ‘Some	   Consequences’	  
237-­‐242))	  in	  their	  artwork’s	  wake.	  For	  you	  can	  indeed	  think	  with	  another’s	  face.	  
You	  do	   it	   by	  presenting	   them	  with	   lines	   such	   as	   ‘Narcissus	  disbelieves	   in	   the	  
unknown;	  /	  He	  cannot	  join	  his	  image	  in	  the	  lake	  /	  So	  long	  as	  he	  assumes	  he	  is	  
alone.’	  (Auden	  312),	  or	  phrases	  like	  ‘The	  armoured	  cars	  of	  dreams’	  (Bishop	  30).	  
	   Yet	   the	   reader	   would	   misunderstand	   Peirce’s	   argument	   if	   he	   or	   she	  
interpreted	   it	   to	  mean	   that	   irregularity	   in	   itself	   perturbs	   us,	   and	   spurs	   us	   to	  
inquiry:	  ‘Why	  should	  it,	  when	  irregularity	  is	  the	  overwhelmingly	  preponderant	  
rule	   of	   experience,	   and	   regularity	   only	   the	   strange	   exception?’	   (88).	   Our	  
tendency	  to	  grasp	  the	  world	  as	  a	  unified	  whole,	  comprised	  of	  wholes,	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  one	  who	  would	  feel	  him	  or	  herself	  whole,	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  we	  
require	  all	  its	  parts	  to	  be	  related	  in	  any	  more	  rule-­‐bound	  way	  than	  that.	  To	  the	  
contrary.	   ‘Nobody	   is	  surprised	  that	   the	  trees	   in	  a	   forest	  do	  not	   form	  a	  regular	  
pattern,	  or	  asks	   for	  any	  explanation	  of	  such	  a	   fact’	   (88).	  Nor	  are	  we	  surprised	  
that	   the	   amount	   of	   words	   in	   this	   paragraph	   has	   an	   irregular	   relation	   to	   the	  
number	  of	  traffic	  lights	  in	  my	  suburb	  of	  Canberra.	  These	  are	  isolated	  facts,	  and	  
again,	   our	   need	   for	   the	   world	   to	   cohere	   is	   far	   from	   disconcerted	   at	   the	  
irregularity	   of	   their	   relation.	   Peirce	   puts	   his	   assault	   upon	   the	   divine	  
watchmaker	  argument	  thus:	  
In	  what	  state	  of	  amazement	  should	  I	  pass	  my	  life,	  if	  I	  were	  to	  wonder	  why	  there	  
was	  no	  regularity	  connecting	  days	  on	  which	  I	  receive	  an	  even	  number	  of	  letters	  
by	  mail	  and	  nights	  on	  which	  I	  notice	  an	  even	  number	  of	  shooting	  stars!	  But	  who	  
would	  seek	  explanations	  for	  irregularities	  like	  that?	  (88)	  
Peirce	   proceeds	   to	   coin	   a	   phrase	   for	   what	   really	   stirs	   us	   to	   want	   to	   know:	  
‘whereas	  if	  it	  were	  an	  equally	  unexpected	  regularity	  we	  had	  met	  with,	  we	  should	  
certainly	   ask	   for	   an	   explanation’	   (88).	   This	   is	   clearly	   another	   way	   of	   saying	  
‘separation,’	   as	   it	   has	   been	   defined	   above:	   a	   mode	   of	   connection	   that	   is	  
dissatisfactory	  to	  us,	  because	  contrary	  to	  expectation	  and	  yet	  convincingly	  real	  
all	  the	  same.	  Auden	  does	  it	  by	  the	  line.	  Bergman	  by	  the	  scene,	  ditto	  Goddard.	  
They	   disturb	   us	   into	   thought	   through	   the	   sense	   that	   yes,	   this	   is	   real—but	  
something	  in	  my	  grasp	  of	  the	  world	  must	  then	  not	  be.	  
	   I	  hold	   that	  a	  doctorate	  of	  creative	  arts	  should	  be	  precisely	   the	  place	   in	  
which	   such	   riskyiii	   contributions,	  whatever	   the	   discipline,	   be	  made,	   the	   place	  
for	   the	   anti-­‐discipline	   from	  which	  knowledge	   floods.	  To	   those	  who	  hold	   that	  
judging	  such	  works	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  I	  would	  suggest	  to	  the	  contrary	  that	  
it	   would	   be	   an	   infinitely	   less	   random	   matter	   than	   judging	   the	   current,	  
impossibly	   compromised	   form	   (see	   further	   Candlin;	  Magee).	   That	   is	   because	  
what	   I	   am	   suggesting	  would	  be	   so	  much	   closer	   to	   the	   criteria	  whereby	   art	   is	  
already	   criticised	   and	   judged.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   I	   would	   claim	   that	   the	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problem	  with	  what	  I	  am	  suggesting	  is	  that	  those	  criteria	  are	  so	  extremely	  hard	  
to	  satisfy.	  
	   For	  thinking	  is	  the	  drug	  that	  will	  make	  good,	  and	  whole.	  	  	  
	   ‘The	   armored	   cars	   of	   dreams’	   (Bishop	   30).	   So	   they	   get	   through	   our	  
defences.	  
	   Bakhtin’s	  writing	  repeatedly	  calls	  forth,	  precisely	  by	  disturbing	  it,	  a	  drive	  
to	  the	  unified	  subject	  in	  his	  readers.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  so	  terrifically	  powerful.	  	  	  
	   	   	  NS	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i	  See,	  for	  a	  pertinent	  example	  of	  such	  formalisation,	  Rocco,	  Biggs	  and	  Büchler,	  
who	   propose	   four	   ‘generic	   requirements’	   for	   investigative	   work,	   whether	  
scientific,	   scholarly	  or	  even	  creative,	   that	  would	  bear	   the	   label	   ‘research’:	   1)	   it	  
must	   put	   forward	   both	   ‘question	   and	   answer’,	   2)	   it	   must	   work	   through	   an	  
articulated	  ‘method’,	  3)	  the	  answer	  it	  produces	  must	  come	  in	  a	  form	  that	  will	  be	  
regarded	  as	  new	  ‘knowledge’	  and	  4)	  there	  must	  be	  a	  specific	  ‘audience’	  who	  so	  
regards	  its	  products	  (376-­‐8).	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ii	   To	   those	   who	   object	   that	   not	   all	   academic	   work	   tends	   this	   way,	   I	   heartily	  
concur,	   and	   point	   to	   the	   post-­‐structuralist	   canon	   as	   the	   very	   thing	   Creative	  
Research	  should	  approach	  for	  its	  stylistic	  models,	  or	  rather	  inspirations.	  Indeed,	  
the	   very	   existence	   of	   that	   canon	   provides	   a	   rhetorical	   platform	   for	   the	  
established	   legitimacy	   of	   just	   what	   I	   am	   proposing	   here:	   refuse	   to	   provide	   a	  
method,	  and	  most	  of	  all	  refuse	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  you	  raise.	  But	  that	  is	  not,	  
by	  and	  large,	  the	  model	  the	  newly	  emergent	  Creative	  Arts	  has	  drawn	  upon	  to	  
establish	  its	   legitimacy.	  Nor	  is	   it,	  statistically	  speaking,	  all	  that	  wide-­‐spread	  in	  
practice,	   even	   in	   academic	   Philosophy,	   where	   the	   ‘attempt	   to	   hone	   in	   on	   a	  
single	  answer	  to	  a	  question’	  rules	  the	  roost.	  
iii	  Risky	  because,	   as	  Peirce	   elsewhere	  makes	   clear,	   there	   are	  manifold	  ways	   to	  
respond	   to	   ‘unexpected	   regularity’	   and	   ‘the’	   scientific	   method	   is	   just	   one	   of	  
them	  (‘The	  Fixation’).	  Belief	  in	  instituted	  authority	  can,	  for	  instance,	  do	  almost	  
as	   good	   a	   service	   in	   repairing	   one’s	   sense	   that	   this	   world’s	   totality	   (here	  
contracted	   to	   a	   narrow	   realm	   of	   human	   relations;	   as	   in	   neoliberalism,	  which	  
makes	  your	  well-­‐being	  utterly	  dependent	  upon	  your	  boss)	  remains	   intact	  (see	  
Peirce	  The	  Fixation	   12-­‐14	  on	  authority	  as	  a	  means	  of	   ‘fixing	  belief’;	   see	  Davies,	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